Habaq Think | Informal Data Collection in As-Sweida: Urgency at the Edge of Risk

A Fragile Humanitarian Landscape

Since 12 July 2025, As-Sweida has been the epicenter of a rapidly escalating conflict that displaced between 158,000 and 192,000 people in just a few weeks (IOM DTM, 10 Aug 2025; OCHA Flash Update No. 6, 5 Aug 2025; OCHA Flash Update No. 5, 31 Jul 2025). Villages emptied overnight, essential services collapsed, and humanitarian corridors became precarious lifelines (South Syria Data, 13 Aug 2025; OCHA Flash Update No. 6). Schools, mosques, and hotels across Dar’a and Rural Damascus were converted into makeshift shelters, most overcrowded and unable to meet basic sanitation standards (CCCM Rapid Site Snapshot, 4 Aug 2025). Humanitarian access was delayed until the Syrian government granted UN convoys permission on 29 July (OCHA Flash Update No. 5).

In this vacuum, local volunteers, charities, and informal groups stepped in; counting families, mapping needs, negotiating evacuations. Their efforts often provided the only real-time information available and gave communities a sense of agency during chaos. These contributions remain vital, but they also expose communities to new risks of protection failures, misinformation, and politicization.

The Perils of Informal Data Collection

1. Safety in a Militarized Space

Collecting data is not neutral in a war zone. Enumerators and respondents risk being accused of espionage or collaboration. A SARC convoy came under fire on 8 August at Busra al-Sham (IOM DTM R10, 10 Aug 2025)—if even official missions are targeted, unprotected volunteers are far more vulnerable.

2. Fragile Data, No Protection

Informal groups often store information on unsecured devices. IOM cautions that key informant interviews can be biased, incomplete, and expose people to harm if misused (IOM DTM R10, 10 Aug 2025). Without anonymization or consent, sensitive data like names and phone numbers can later be exploited by armed actors or authorities.

3. Numbers that Compete, Not Clarify

Already, displacement figures diverge: OCHA cites 191,700 (OCHA Flash Update No. 6, 5 Aug 2025), and IOM 158,709 (IOM DTM R10). Adding unverified local counts risks deepening confusion, undermining credibility, and shaping aid around politics rather than needs.

4. Access as a Political Arena

Humanitarian access in Syria is tightly controlled. ICVA underscores that coordination often bends to government relations at the expense of communities (Coordinating in Crisis). In As-Sweida, demonstrations explicitly demanded aid and humanitarian corridors (OCHA Flash Update No. 6; OCHA Flash Update No. 5). Data gathered outside official humanitarian frameworks risks being ignored by decision‑makers, or worse, used to advance political agendas rather than humanitarian needs.

Risks Ahead

  • Targeting of Vulnerable Groups: Lists of displaced families could later be weaponized to identify and punish perceived opponents.
  • Exclusion by Design: Informal networks may count their own, leaving out minorities, women, or people with disabilities (CCCM Rapid Site Snapshot).
  • Fragmentation of Response: Competing figures weaken coordination and delay relief. OCHA notes persistent gaps between what communities perceive and what aid actually reaches them (OCHA Flash Update No. 6).

Pathways to Safer Practice

For Informal Groups

  • Collect only aggregates: number of households and key needs, not names or addresses.
  • Explain purpose clearly: ensure communities know data does not guarantee aid.
  • Secure and anonymize: remove identifiers immediately; avoid open storage.
  • Never share WhatsApp contact lists or raw spreadsheets with untrusted actors.
  • Coordinate: align with OCHA, DTM, or SARC to validate figures.
  • Close the loop: share back results with communities to build trust.

For International Agencies

  • Offer rapid training on data protection and accountability.
  • Publish a simple joint protocol for what community actors can safely collect.
  • Validate informal data before integrating into needs assessments or response planning.

Potential Risks Under the UN Cybercrime Treaty

The United Nations Convention against Cybercrime was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 24 December 2024 (A/RES/79/243)【UN GA, Dec 2024】. It is scheduled to open for signature in Hanoi on 25–26 October 2025, after which states may also sign at UN Headquarters until 2026. The treaty will enter into force 90 days after the 40th ratification【UNODC, Convention Overview】.

Rights groups, academics, and legal experts have flagged several potential risks that could affect humanitarian data collection in places like As-Sweida:

  1. Cross-border data requests
    • The convention enables states to seek electronic evidence for any “serious crime” (defined as an offense punishable by at least four years’ imprisonment).
    • Human Rights Watch warns this broad scope could allow governments to frame political or humanitarian activities as crimes, then demand user data from foreign providers【Human Rights Watch, Dec 2024】.
  2. Broad offense definitions
    • Offenses like “illegal access” and “data interference” are drafted in vague terms, with uneven requirements for intent.
    • Analyses in Lawfare and PRIF Spotlight note this vagueness could place security researchers, journalists, or volunteers at risk if their data-gathering is recast as unauthorized access【Lawfare, Aug 2024】【PRIF Spotlight, Nov 2024】.
  3. Politicization of cooperation
    • The treaty’s human-rights safeguards are general and non-binding. Unlike the Budapest Convention, they are not woven into each procedural article.
    • EFF and HRW warn that other states may still be legally obliged to assist with politically motivated requests, even if these target activists or NGOs【EFF, Dec 2024】【Human Rights Watch, Dec 2024】.
  4. Chilling effect
    • Because the line between humanitarian monitoring and “cybercrime” can be blurred, local volunteers may fear both domestic retaliation and international cooperation against them.
    • Analysts stress this could discourage urgent documentation of needs in crises like Sweida【CyberPeace Institute, Aug 2024】.

Bottom line: These are potential risks now, but once the treaty opens for signature in October 2025 and gathers ratifications, they could become real tools used against informal humanitarian data collectors.

Conclusion

In As-Sweida, data has become as contested as territory. Numbers are not just statistics; they shape legitimacy, dictate aid, and fuel narratives. Informal groups are indispensable first responders, and their commitment deserves recognition. Yet without safeguards, their data collection risks harming those they seek to protect. The way forward is not to stop them, but to connect them into coordinated, principled frameworks where urgency and safety meet. Only then can data illuminate suffering instead of deepening it.

Key sources:

  • CCCM Cluster & REACH. Rapid Site Displacement Snapshot – Update 2, 4 Aug 2025.
  • ICVA. Coordinating in Crisis.
  • IOM. Displacement Tracking Matrix – Humanitarian Situation Report (Round 10), 10 Aug 2025.
  • OCHA. Flash Update No. 5: Escalation of Hostilities in As-Sweida, 31 Jul 2025.
  • OCHA. Flash Update No. 6: Escalation of Hostilities in As-Sweida, 5 Aug 2025.
  • UNODC. United Nations Convention against Cybercrime – At a Glance (Dec 2024).
  • Human Rights Watch. New UN Cybercrime Treaty Primed for Abuse (30 Dec 2024).
  • Electronic Frontier Foundation. Still Flawed and Lacking Safeguards: UN Cybercrime Treaty (16 Dec 2024).
  • Lawfare. Confusion and Contradiction in the UN Cybercrime Convention (Aug 2024).
  • PRIF Spotlight 11/2024. Between a Rock and a Hard Place – The UN Cybercrime Convention.
  • CyberPeace Institute. UN Cybercrime Convention Adopted: Concerns Remain (Aug 2024).

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